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3Space Systems Protection Mission 
Support Office Creation
• In response to NSPD-49 and in anticipation of 
need, Goddard has created a Space Systems 
Protection Mission Support Office to provide 
consolidated protection services for Goddard- 
managed missions.
• Consolidates Goddard support for:
– Orbit Debris Analysis
– Conjunction Assessment/Collision Avoidance
– Commercial and Foreign Entities Support
– Protection of Goddard-managed missions
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5SSP MSO Charter
 Coordinate the development and application of space asset 
protection activities
 Function as the sole interface between the DoD and Goddard to 
enable and facilitate the exchange of SSA information and data 
products
 Create tools & methods to protect Goddard assets
 Prepare lifecycle specific threat summaries, survivability strategies 
and program/project protection plans for all Goddard-managed 
missions. 
 Protection plans are based on each mission’s survivability strategy and 
payload risk category.
 Perform CA for Robotic Missions
 Perform Orbital Debris Assessments and End of Mission Planning 
for pre-launch and operational missions to meet NASA 
requirements
6Protection
Employ measures to 
ensure US and Allied 
space capabilities 
operate as planned
Ensure Freedom of Action
in Space for
US and Allied Forces
Prevention
Employ measures to prevent 
adversary use of US & 
friendly space capabilities for 
purposes hostile to the US
Negation
Disrupt, Deny, or 
Destroy 
adversary space 
capabilities
Space Control
Deny Freedom of Action
In Space
to Our Adversaries
Space Situational Awareness
Historic, current, and predictive knowledge to enable decision 
makingIntegrated Command and Control Data Fusion and Exploitation
Space Control Objectives and Missions
7NASA Goddard SSA Enablers
• GMSEC middleware automation can be 
developed
– can be configured to pass telemetry in automated 
fashion
– can build tools to analyze the telemetry for threats 
and then pass automatically to JSpOC in near real- 
time
• New secure facility certified for use at 
appropriate levels
– Physical space to expand
Current Goddard Robotic SSA 
Activities
9Robotic Conjunction Assessment
• Policy for Limiting Orbital Debris (NPR 8715.6) requires 
routine CA for all NASA assets with maneuvering capability 
(signed 8/17/07).
– perigee height less than 2000 km or within 200 km of 
GEO
• Screenings provided by dedicated OSAs at the JSpOC
• Goddard analysts use OCMs and automated s/w to 
evaluate threat associated with each predicted event in 
screening, plan avoidance maneuvers as necessary
– Analysis of geometry, quality of OD solution, tracking resources, and 
Pc computation.
• Process in place since Jan 2005; new requirement is 
driving rapid expansion of capabilities
• Governing Documents:
– Interagency Operating Instruction (draft in O6 coord)
– NASA/DoD MOA – signed March 2005
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FY09 CA Customer Base
Earth Science 
Constellation
GEO Regime Other NASA 
Missions
14780 - Landsat -5
25682 - Landsat-7 
25994 - Terra 
26619 - EO-1
26620 - SAC-C 
27424 - Aqua
27642 - ICESat
28376 - Aura
28498 - PARASOL
29108 - CALIPSO
TBD – OCO (launch ~2/09)
TBD – Glory (launch ~10/09)
13969 - TDRS 1
19548 - TDRS 3
19883 - TDRS 4
21639 - TDRS 5
22314 - TDRS 6 
23613 - TDRS 7
26388 - TDRS 8
27389 - TDRS 9
27566 - TDRS 10
TBD - GOES-8 (launch 11/08 
– L&EO only)
TBD - SDO (launch ~ 4/09)
26997 - Jason
22076 - TOPEX
25063 - TRMM 
27391 - GRACE-1
27392 - GRACE-2
33053 - GLAST
33105 – OSTM/Jason-2
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Commercial and Foreign Entities 
Program Support [1 of 2]
• DoD funds NASA to serve as Liaison between CFE 
customers and USSTRATCOM
– Provides single Point of Contact between CFE community and 
responsible officials at JSpOC/DoD
– Form 1 processing – coordinate input from CFEs to ensure 
correct requests
– R-15s/VIMs – collect and submit data
– Exchange launch Forecast Information
– Notifies USSTRATCOM of significant orbit maneuvers
• Goddard’s Flight Dynamics Facility supports 
commercial launch vehicles and therefore has ready 
access to data needed for SSA by DoD. 
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Commercial and Foreign Entities 
Program Support [2 of 2]
• NASA provides secure communications services to DoD 
through our Comm Center
– SECRET-level facility approved by DISA 
– Houses copy of public catalog received daily in addition to 
other types of messages
– Reformats data and automatically distributes it over various 
media per approved Form 1 requests 
– Routes two line elements (TLEs) received via the Dahlgren 
encrypted communications link to “Space-Track” Website. 
– Launch support:  coordinates in advance with JSpOC to 
understand which new object numbers will be utilized for 
imminent launches to ensure that approved customers will 
be able to receive the messages in a timely manner.  
– upgrade in progress to Multifunctional Secure Gateway 
system from Message Distribution System
• Working with USSTRATCOM and AFSPC to define role in 
future CFE program.
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DoD Use of Comm Center
• NOAA (GOES, POLAR, METEOSAT, CORIOLIS, etc.)
• AF/Suitland (DMSP) receives customized TLE messages
• TLEs to Space Track website (“do not distribute” TLEs 
are stripped off before rest of catalog is sent)
• Send messages via military channels for distribution to 
entities at Wallops Island
– Radiation Requests/Reply (from ships at sea) via Autodin routed 
to Wallops via email for determining frequency interference
– Aviation Safety messages from Safety Office at Redstone 
Arsenal, AL. routed back to Wallops via AMDS email.
– TLEs for ISS and Soyuz for NASA Reps at Wallops Range for 
antenna pointing
14
Space Protection SSA
• Goddard currently does not do much SSA reporting
– NASA sends space weather data to NOAA from various assets 
such as SOHO & ACE
– “MOA Between DoD and NASA for DoD Support to NASA 
Spaceflight Operations” lists requirements for data exchange in 
detail. (signed Mar 05)
• Attempting to centralize and improve SSA data 
collection
– Developing notification process for significant events to 
strengthen interface with DoD to ensure timely reaction to 
events.
• In future will work together to share knowledge and 
lessons learned with other NASA centers and civil 
agencies as appropriate to improve SSA
– Goddard Space Flight Center is responsible for robotic assets
– Johnson Space Center is responsible for human spaceflight
– USGS partners with NASA to fly Landsat missions 
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Orbital Debris Support
• NPR 8715.6 requires that orbital debris be 
limited to the maximum extent possible, through 
assessments of debris generation potential and 
disposal planning
• NASA-STD 8719.14 defines the requirements 
for development and operational missions
• SSP-MSO directly supports all GSFC missions 
with respect to orbital debris mitigation activities
• JSC/ODPO provides support to the entire 
agency, and serves as the technical point of 
contact for orbital debris and end of mission 
issues
Potential Future Robotic SSA Activities
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Goals
• Share capabilities and data among government organizations 
for improved SSA
– NASA looks forward to working with DoD in its role of supporting 
civil space in asset protection 
– NASA is both a producer and a consumer of SSA data
– NASA is willing to share SSA data and information derived 
from 40+ operational missions with the DoD
– NASA is prepared to do what is appropriate to protect our space 
systems
• Create strong collaborative relationship between NASA and 
JFCC-SPACE 
– To support JCD functional components as directed by NSPD-49
– To resolve operational issues efficiently and quickly
– To be actively involved in the definition of DoD-provided SSA 
products and services for use by NASA to enable and enhance 
our protection capabilities.
18
NASA Capabilities [1 of 2]
• Operational Collision Risk Assessment / Avoidance Maneuver 
Planning 
– Probabilistic Risk assessment for 24 satellites, 12 different 
Owner/Operators
– Avoidance maneuver planning for both GEO and LEO satellites 
– Expertise can be generalized to support other missions 
– Develop risk reduction maneuver strategies that account for mission- 
unique capabilities and constraints
• Modeling & Simulation 
– Long term evolution of debris clouds – characterization of break-ups 
– Empirical Flux Regime Characterization – estimation of expected # of 
conjunction events
– Can quickly evaluate various SSN Tracking Scenarios to determine 
expected accuracy 
– Coverage analysis for space-based tracking
– Analysis of covariance realism, sparse tracking, etc
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NASA Capabilities [2 of 2]
• Orbit Estimation 
– Expertise in both batch least squares and EKF 
– Currently performing OD for ~40 satellites 
– Techniques using EKF to detect delta-V maneuvers
• Re-Entry Analysis
– Footprint targeting, maneuver design
– Supported GRO, EUVE, and UARS reentries
• Space weather
– Data from NASA assets could be routed to DoD in addition to 
current NOAA interface
– Schatten predicts produced under contract to Goddard
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CFE/SSA in the Space Community
• One of the services frequently requested via Form 1 is 
Conjunction Assessment
• In April 2008, the AIAA Space Ops Technical Committee 
formed a subcommittee on Conjunction Assessment.
– Overarching Mission: Understand and improve the state of 
operational conjunction risk and security.
– Publish series of white papers 
• describing the current state of CA
• Suggest improvements to meet community needs
• Key topics:
– Topic 1.  The current state of Conjunction Assessment
– Topic 2. Risk/Conjunction Model. 
– Topic 3. Risk Control Protocol.
– Topic 4. Space Traffic Control, Notional Architecture
– AIAA Astrodynamics Conference in Pittsburgh in Aug 2009 
targeted for Topic 1 (invited session).  
– Survey to be sent to industry to collect data on current state.
• Intelsat Consortium – data center; NASA was contacted to 
participate
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Current CA Data to CFEs Not Sufficient
• Need way to provide service to all CFEs if CA is to be done 
accurately to prevent debris generation and protect all assets.
• The Problem:  CFEs only have access to GP public catalog.   
– CA screenings are inaccurate, causing extra work for Owner/Operator 
and Air Force to investigate identified false conjunctions. 
– Some true conjunctions may not be identified at all, causing risk to all 
GEO users if collision occurs. 
– Planning avoidance maneuvers is iterative shot-in-the-dark process – 
bad for time-critical issue.
• Even use of SP catalog requires additional analysis to 
determine true threat of event
– Miss distances (& Pc) currently provided by Air Force in response to 
Form 1 CA request are not sufficient for O/O to evaluate threat. (If 
maneuver is performed and miss distance was inaccurate due to high 
uncertainty, could cause risk to asset.)  Need analysis of Orbit 
Determination solution by experienced analysts to determine threat and 
mitigation.
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Potential CFE CA Solution
• Proposed Solution:  AF provides CA service similar to current 
arrangement with NASA/Goddard
– Customer pays for screening service.  
– Screening results sent to “CA data evaluation center”.  
– Experienced analysts evaluate risk to asset.
– Analysts provide 1st guess for avoidance maneuver size, timing, and/or 
direction to O/O. 
– O/O creates maneuver ephemeris and sends back for rescreening.  
• Benefits:
– Would improve SSA and safety of all US assets.
– No SP data is released to O/O if U.S. Government (military or civil) 
operates the data center
– DoD would gain access to ephemeris data from all O/O, improving 
catalog accuracy and reducing tasking load
• Goddard already provides analysis service using AF screening 
data to a set of users including FSOs.
– New CFE system could be modeled on this prototype
– Could extend services to other customers having approved Tailored 
Agreements
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Way Ahead
• Space Protection:  
– Continue to build relationship with DoD
• Met with JFCC-SPACE on 09 Oct 08 to discuss potential future SSA 
collaboration.
• Visited JSpOC 12/08
– Develop automated capability to provide NASA SSA info to JFCC- 
SPACE in timely manner
• White paper in development – propose fusing spacecraft engineering 
data to identify, characterize and distribute SSA from GSFC 
operational missions.  Data could be passed to DoD in near real-time.
• Orbital Debris:
– Continue to prepare Orbit Debris Assessment Reports and End of 
Mission Plans for Goddard robotic missions
– Continue to build cooperation between center orbital debris specialists 
and SSP-MSO
• CA:
– Investigate possible automation of CA screenings
• CFE:
– Continue participation in evolving efforts, help in any way needed
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Summary
• SSA
– Goddard can offer some data to DoD in support of 
the SSA effort
– We are prepared to help and want to partner – tell us 
what you need
– Goddard is prepared to do analysis, algorithm 
development, etc. in support of JSpOC
• As we develop the SSPMSO, if there are things 
we can do in support of DoD, we would like that 
input and will try to accommodate.
• NASA wants to be able to help define what SSA 
support products we need from DoD
Backup Charts
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Risk Assessment by CA Team
• Screening data is analyzed in two distinct ways
– Routine Operations 
• Daily activity to assess most recent delivery of close 
approach predictions
• Disposition conjunctions as a “threat”, “not a threat”, or 
“monitor” event based on analysis
– High Interest Events
• Events that have significant potential to be a threat or 
provide a unique analysis opportunity
• Trending of orbit determination parameters and conjunction 
geometry
• Probability of Collision Sensitivity analysis
• Risk Mitigation Maneuver planning 
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High Interest Event Risk Assessment
• Pc and miss distance data alone cannot be used to fully 
assess the threat
• Additional analyses to help establish and quantify risk 
include:
– Orbit determination (OD) consistency from solution to solution
• Number of tracks and observations
• Ballistic Coefficient
• Solar Radiation Pressure Coefficient
• Energy Dissipation Rate
• Radar Cross Sectional Area
– Probabilistic Risk Assessment Analysis
• Realistic probability calculations based on ‘realistic’ state and 
covariance predictions
• Pc evolution as the time to the close approach event gets shorter
• Pc sensitivity analysis based on changes to inputs
– Conjunction Geometry (clock angle, approach angle)
– Position of hard body radius with respect to the 3-sigma 
covariance ellipse
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The Collision Assessment System
• Collision Assessment System (CAS) was developed to 
store and analyze the large volumes of data received. 
• CAS is automated and comprised of several elements:
– Secure File Transfer Protocol Server
– Parser / Monitor Scripts
– Database
– Collision Assessment and Mitigation (CAM) Tool Suite
– Secure Website
– Configuration Management System
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Collision Assessment 
and Mitigation Tool Suite
• The CAM Tool Suite is the part of CAS that 
provides analysis utilities 
• The CAM Tool Suite consists of 6 modules:
1. Conjunction Visualization Script
2. 2-D Collision Probability Utility
3. Monte Carlo Simulation
4. 3-D / Curvilinear Collision Probability Tool
5. Time History Trending Utility
6. Collision Avoidance Planning Tool
• The modules are built using FreeFlyerTM and 
MatlabTM
• Output from tools is formatted into a single 
PDF report for each OCM
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Current NASA/GSFC Support: 
Liaison Function
• Provides single Point of Contact between CFE 
community and responsible officials at JSpOC/DoD
– While points of contact in the DoD world change frequently, 
NASA has provided a stable interface for many years, so the 
community knows who to contact for support 
– Valuable contacts and excellent rapport are maintained among 
government and commercial customers
• Provides technical coordination to non-DoD customers 
in preparing data requests and obtaining DoD support.
• Goddard is uniquely qualified to provide this support 
because we have in-house access to NASA payload 
and commercial launch vehicle data within our Flight 
Dynamics Facility (FDF)
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Liaison Functions [1 of 2]
• Coordinates all NASA and CFE Form 1 Requests 
– Ensures form is correct and complete, clarifies requests
– Coordinates required data formats, delivery mode, data 
frequency
– Ensures proper handling of sensitive data
– Facilitates required discussions between DoD and 
customer to resolve any open items
– Coordinates approved Form 1s with all parties after 
approval and comm center is notified of approved 
requests
– Tracks status of all requests until decision is received, 
maintains records of all approved Form 1s 
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Liaison Functions [2 of 2]
• Coordinates Vehicle Information Message (VIM) / R-15 
Submissions
• Coordinates notification to USSTRATCOM by CFEs for 
significant spacecraft maneuvers, launches, anomalies, etc.
• Anomaly resolution support
– Liaison facilitates rapid Form 1 submission to get USSTRATCOM 
emergency support.
• Launch Support
– Liaison provides real-time launch support to ensure all requested data 
is received
– Exchanges Launch Forecast information with USSTRATCOM
– Coordinates launch slips and/or schedule changes – re-issue Form 1s 
and VIM data as required.
• Coordinates Encrypted Circuit Communication Line Issue 
Resolution with Dahlgreen, Goddard Comm Center, and 
Cheyenne Mt. Tech Control
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Summary of Comm Center Functions
• Routine Support
– Unclassified TLEs through Goddard Network Integration 
Communications Center to specified customers.
• Non-Sensitive Launch Support
– USSTRATCOM sends new TLE information for new objects 
according to  Form 1 requests.  Goddard Communications 
Center forwards the new TLE information to approved 
customers and to the Space-Track Web site.
– Router Information must be  correct on Form 1 in order for the 
Customer(s) to received data requested.
• Sensitive Launch
– USSTRACOM does not send the TLE information for new 
sensitive objects until coordination has been completed with 
Goddard Liaison and Communications Center.
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Current NASA/GSFC Support: 
Comm Center Functions
• SECRET-level facility approved by DISA 
• Provides automated real-time distribution of 
USSTRATCOM products to approved Form 1 
customers. 
• Uses encrypted data transmission line through 
Dahlgreen
– Bandwidth problem causing data dropouts as 
identified by Cheyenne Mountain Tech Control
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Comm Center Functions
• Not just bent pipe – value added services provided
– Reformatting
• Strip single TLEs from multiple-TLE messages for distribution
• FDF data reformatted to remove headers and sent to SPADOC
– Handles distribution across various media types (email, 
FAX, teletype…)
– Keeps database of approved Form 1 requests such that 
data is automatically forwarded to customers when 
updates are received
– Launch Support
• Comm Center coordinates in advance with USSTRATCOM to 
understand which new object numbers will be utilized for imminent 
launches to ensure that customers with approved requests will be 
able to receive the messages in a timely manner.  
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NASA Issues
Issue Human Space Flight 
Support DOCUMENTS
Robotics Support 
DOCUMENTS
NOTIFICATION PROCESS for 
SIGNIFICANT  EVENTS
SSA Data Sharing
•Ephemeris data STRAT/NASA OSO HSF OI JFCC SPACE/NASA 
Goddard Robotics IOI
OSA and FDO/TOPO
•Launch Safety and Recovery SI 534-6 SI 534-6
•Environmental/Space Weather
•Maneuvers STRAT/NASA OSO HSF OI JFCC SPACE/NASA 
Goddard Robotics IOI
OSA ,FDO/TOPO, CAA
•Breakups STRAT/NASA OSO HSF OI JFCC SPACE/NASA 
Goddard IOI for  Robotics 
Support
OSA ,FDO/TOPO, CAA
•Conjunction Analysis/Collision 
Avoidance 
STRAT/NASA OSO HSF OI JFCC SPACE/NASA 
Goddard IOI for Robotics  
support
OSA ,FDO/TOPO, CAA
•Characterize, assess & resolve 
anomalies (EMI, RFI are 
subsets)
Building annex for next revision 
of STRAT/NASA OSO HSF OI
???
•NASA partners
o Applicability of 
NASA agreements
RM for Human Spaceflight JFCC SPACE CA Data RM 
for NASA Robotics 
Missions. 
Other civil agencies (USGS, NOAA)
ISS partners (Russia, Japan, Canada, 
ESA primary – AEB (Brazil) and ISA 
(Italy)
STS partners (mission dependent). 
ESC partners (France, Argentina, 
Germany)
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NASA Issues cont
Issue Human Space Flight Support 
DOCUMENTS
Robotics Support 
DOCUMENTS
NOTIFICATION PROCESS for 
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
Notification Process for 
Significant Events (primarily 
limited to safety of flight, not 
EMI)
STRAT/NASA OSO HSF OI JFCC SPACE/NASA 
Goddard IOI for Robotics 
support
Event Reporting Timeliness 
Standards
Data 
STRAT/NASA OSO HSF OI JFCC SPACE/NASA 
Goddard IOI for Robotics 
support
Types/Formats/Transmissio 
n Means
STRAT/NASA OSO HSF OI JFCC SPACE/NASA 
Goddard IOI for Robotics 
support
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JFCC SPACE Issues
Issue Documentation or 
Proposed action
Resolution/Way 
Ahead
Security Considerations
•Operational – NASA 
limited to Sensitive-but- 
Unclassified (SBU)
RM ‘s or NASA Human Spaceflight 
and Robotics Missions
•ITAR RM ‘s or NASA Human Spaceflight 
and Robotics Missions
Resources – Level of 
Support Requested Vs. :
•Manpower PWS/SOO/SOW
Support Agreement  between  
AFSPC and NASA/GSFC
•Funding
•Equipment
Launch cooperation 
from NASA for non- 
domestic/non- 
cooperative launches
Advance collaboration  or 
notification  to support 
building  ELSET 1 Microsoft Office 
rd 97 - 2003 Docum
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Intelsat Proposed CA Data Flow – Phase 
2
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ESC Risk Mitigation 
Maneuvers Performed
Asset Secondary Maneuver 
Date
Minimum Total 
Miss (m)
Pc
Terra 14222
(SCOUT G-1)
21-Oct, 2005 37 6.82E-2
PARASOL 81257
(Analyst SAT)
16-Jan, 2007 43 1.51E-3
SAC-C 14345
(SL-8 DEB)
16-Feb, 2007 57 3.40E-6
Terra 31410
(FENGYUN 1C DEB)
22-Jun, 2007 18 1.58E-1
CloudSat 28893
(SINAH 1)
04-Jul, 2007 38 2.24E-2
Aura 1399
(TRIAD 1 Debris )
26-Jun, 2008 11 4.80E-1
CloudSat 8542
(Delta I Debris)
20-Jul, 2008 90 1.77E-3
PARASOL 31293
(FENGYUN 1C DEB)
19-Oct, 2008 82 2.11E-2
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Space Situational Awareness Tasks
• Environmental Information
1.  Monitor, characterize, predict and report on the space related 
environment, i.e, terrestrial weather; atmospheric, ionospheric, 
magnetospheric, solar and interplanetary conditions.
 Goddard “Push” space weather data 
 Goddard “Pull” TBD
• Orbital and Network Information
2.  Detect, track, identify and catalog man-made objects in space
 Goddard “Push” state vectors for operational missions to ease 
burden on SSN
 Goddard “Pull” catalog data to support in-house collision avoidance
3.  Provide battle-space information and services
 “Pull” signal/laser de-confliction and space network nodal analysis
• Event Information
4.  Detect, process and report space events, i.e, launches, orbital 
maneuvers, break-ups, reentries, orbital decay, dockings, etc.
 Goddard “Push” maneuver data for operational missions, launch 
forecast
 Goddard “Pull” breakup data for CA analysis
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Space Situational Awareness Tasks 
(cont)
• Event Information (cont)
5.  Characterize, assess and resolve anomalies/attacks on all space 
systems, i.e, provide I&W of attacks, support resolution of anomalies, 
provide sufficient information to attribute source of attack/interference, 
etc.
 “Push” operational status of Goddard missions, anomaly reports
 “Pull” technology (sensors and automation) that supports DoD capabilities for 
generating event information
• US Space System Information
6.  Maintain the status and characteristics of Blue Space Forces/Assets, i.e, 
physical properties, current status, vulnerabilities, constellation 
composition, etc.
 “Push” operational status and vulnerabilities of Goddard missions
 “Pull” same/similar bus engineering/operations information to assist in fault 
isolation and anomaly resolution of Goddard spacecraft.
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Space Situational Awareness Tasks 
(cont)
• Space Intelligence Information
7.  Provide intelligence on foreign and adversary space systems, i.e, space 
related communications links, on-orbit asset locations, etc.
 “Pull” intelligence information when required to protect Goddard missions.
8.  Maintain current foreign and adversary space system characteristics and 
operating parameters, i.e, physical and signal properties, function, signal 
internals and operating parameters, etc.
 “Pull” intelligence information when required to protect Goddard missions.
9.  Detect, monitor and report on foreign and adversary terrestrial space 
systems, i.e, fixed and mobile systems for command and control, launch 
and exploitation, etc.
 “Pull” intelligence information when required to protect Goddard missions.
10. Develop predictive battle-space awareness on adversary strategies, 
tactics, intent, activity, and knowledge, i.e, identify adversary centers of 
gravity, likely courses of action, strengths and vulnerabilities to support 
targeting and intelligence collection, etc.
 “Pull” intelligence information when required to protect Goddard missions.
